Why young people in Asia are disengaging from democracy | East Asia Forum

East Asia’s high-income democracies are facing a troubling trend: the future custodians of democracy are turning away from democratic politics. This democratic malaise has taken on different forms. In Japan, it appears as a passive attitude towards politics, in Taiwan, it draws young people toward populist choices and in South Korea, it deepens the divide between genders, compromising social cohesion.

Regionally, the median age has risen to 40.5 in 2024, while the fertility rate has dropped to just 1 childbirth per woman. This is starkly different from 1975 when the numbers were 20 and 3.34, respectively. As the population ages, young people are increasingly excluded from equality, representation and economic development. Alarmingly, only 1.84 per cent of parliamentarians in Asia are under 30.

Japan’s ‘silver democracy’ exemplifies how an aging society can result in the political overshadowing of younger voices. In the 2021 Japanese general election, less than 10 per cent of the 1,051 registered candidates were under 40. Voter turnout for those in their twenties was about half that of those in their sixties, making the median voter age 59. The centre of gravity in Japanese electoral politics has shifted from taxpayers to pensioners, with the elderly increasingly more influential.

Young people in Japan feel disconnected from politics, with low political efficacy and difficulty understanding political issues. Japanese youth have the lowest political interest compared to peers in other democracies like France, Germany, South Korea, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States. Other surveys show growing disinterest in voting among high school students, with many feeling dissatisfied with politics and believing it doesn’t reflect public opinion.

Institutional barriers, such as a higher-than-average voting age of 20, have limited youth participation and motivation to engage. Even after Japan lowered the voting age to 18 in 2015, youth apathy persisted. The voting age reduction was prompted by the conservative ruling Liberal Democratic Party’s popularity among conservative younger voters.

But recent political scandals like the slush fund scandal have seriously eroded public trust in former prime minister Fumio Kishida and the Liberal Democratic Party. A recent survey of young people aged 17–19 showed over 70 per cent believe lawmakers enjoy privileges, nearly 80 per cent feel politics doesn’t reflect the people’s will and 87 per cent think politics isn’t transparent.

Taiwanese youth are gravitating toward technocratic and populist alternatives. The Taiwan People’s Party (TPP), led by Ko Wen-je, has emerged as a ‘third way’ between the progressive Democratic Progressive Party and the socially conservative Kuomintang.

In the 2024 presidential election, the TPP posed a significant challenge to Taiwan’s traditional two-party system, drawing strong support from younger voters. Ko secured 26.5 per cent of the vote, the highest share for a third-party candidate since 2000. The appeal of the TPP reflects young people’s desire for change, particularly as the Democratic Progressive Party is increasingly viewed as part of the establishment and not the revolutionary challenger it was in the 2014 Sunflower Movement.

Despite Taiwan’s seemingly resilient economy, young people face mounting challenges, including high housing costs, stagnant wages and significant youth unemployment. While older generations may focus on Taiwan’s relationship with China, younger voters are more concerned with economic issues such as jobs, wages and social justice.

The TPP capitalised on these concerns, using social media campaigns to attract support. Economic development is the top priority for most Taiwanese voters aged 20–39, underscoring a shift from national security to more immediate, material concerns. This generational shift marks a significant change in Taiwan’s political landscape, with young people seeking alternatives to the long-standing two-party dominance.

In South Korea, there is a stark ideological divide between genders — while young women are more progressive, young men lean towards conservatism. This ideological chasm is stronger among younger generations, with Gen Z split into two distinct ideological camps.

Young men face unique economic struggles, which have fuelled this divide. The erosion of stable, full-time employment and the rise of precarious jobs have exacerbated their frustrations, leading to a less secure future. The share of young men not in education, employment or training has surged from 8 per cent in 2000 to 21 per cent in 2017, while for female it has fallen from 44 per cent to 21 per cent over the same period.

South Korean politicians have already pandered to these disillusioned young men. President Yoon Suk-yeol’s 2022 campaign promise to abolish the gender-equality ministry, along with his claims that feminism harms healthy relationships between men and women, is a stark example of this trend.

The rise of anti-feminist sentiment in South Korea is not only a political issue but also a social one, with potential long-term impacts on the country’s already-low birth rates. Online platforms have become breeding grounds for misogyny, with ‘men’s rights influencers’ stoking anger towards women.

These trends threaten the stability of East Asia’s democracies. The widening gender divide and growing disenchantment among young men are deepening social rifts, undermining the prospects for a cohesive democratic future. As young people drift apart politically and socially, they risk turning towards populism and non-democratic ideals.

Intifar Chowdhury is Lecturer of Government at Flinders University, Australia.