In light of the multifaceted challenge posed by China, the traditional concept of strategic denial – envisioned as the prevention of military access to the Freely Associated States (FAS) by third countries – is no longer sufficient. The United States needs to revisit the origins of strategic denial in the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands and retool it for modern geopolitical competition. Strategic denial must evolve from merely the prevention of military use of, and building in, the FAS into a holistic concept, shifting from a narrow right to a responsibility to prevent the building of malign influence and presence in Micronesia.
The Freely Associated States – Palau, the Marshall Islands, and Federated States of Micronesia (FSM) – are of critical importance to U.S. national security in the Indo-Pacific. In exchange for generous financial aid, the United States is granted extensive and exclusive defense rights and responsibilities for the FAS. Of these rights, strategic denial has figured most prominently in the minds of policymakers, yet its shifting interpretation has left it insufficient to address strategic competition with China.
In the opening salvo of the Pacific War, the Empire of Japan “suddenly and deliberately” attacked the United States across the Pacific Ocean. While the strikes on Pearl Harbor were carried out through carrier airpower, Japan’s attacks on Wake Island and the Philippines were launched from the Marshall Islands and Palau, respectively.
To reach the Japanese mainland and prevent the use of Pacific islands to strike U.S. territory, the U.S. military endeavored on an ambitious and deadly island-hopping campaign. With Japan defeated, the United States looked for a way to ensure it would never need to make such sacrifices again. Protecting its security and corridor access through the Pacific, however, could be an expensive enterprise. Given the high costs of building an offensive perimeter, the United States developed a different approach: the doctrine of strategic denial. The United States would deny other states the ability to establish military bases in the region, allowing the United States to maintain its Pacific dominance at minimum cost.
Over time, however, the interpretation of strategic denial in the FAS has shifted. Many reports today describe strategic denial as the right to deny other nations’ militaries from accessing the FAS, especially their maritime spaces. These spaces are often identified as approximately the size of the continental United States – never mind that under the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, the United States can only block other nations from transiting the FAS’ territorial seas, a much smaller space.
Strategic denial is not just a concept, but a specific right enumerated in the Compacts of Free Association (COFAs) that closes each FAS to the militaries of third countries. A revitalized concept of strategic denial is not an overreach of this right. The United States exercises both rights and responsibilities for the security of the FAS. Retooling strategic denial for modern geostrategic competition would shift strategic denial from solely a narrow right into a broader responsibility, in partnership with the FAS, to protect their sovereignties.
To maintain a free and open Indo-Pacific and exercise its security responsibilities to the FAS, the United States needs to reengage with the origins of strategic denial, refitting it for a modern age of great power competition. The Japanese presence in Micronesia prior to Pearl Harbor looks fundamentally different to modern-day Chinese influence in the Pacific. Japan garrisoned the islands, turning them into military bases from which it could project power, protect its homeland, and secure sea lines of communication. At its inception, strategic denial aimed to prevent any foreign powers from using the FAS to the same end: building and utilizing military installations.
China does not operate in the same way. Instead of constructing military installations, Beijing builds political influence. China uses a braided approach of licit and illicit tactics to bring nations into its sphere of influence. Nowhere is this more visible than in the Pacific islands. While for the foreseeable future, the United States does not need to worry about China erecting a military airfield, that does not mean that the United States can let down its guard. China’s influence can and does undermine U.S. security, especially in the FAS.
Chinese presence in the region opens U.S. military sites to potential espionage and subterfuge. For instance, under a current loophole, Chinese citizens can travel to the Marianas Islands visa-free – the only place in the United States where this is allowed. Chinese nationals have exploited this to travel undetected to Guam, home to substantial U.S. military installations. Chinese “tourists” have even been found with inflatable boats as their sole luggage on trips to the Northern Mariana Islands. Although China is not landing J-20s in Guam, covert activities – including surveillance – can prove equally damaging to national security.
Revitalizing strategic denial in the FAS does not imply creating an exclusive American lake; instead it means promoting a free and open Indo-Pacific and benefiting the COFA states through partnership. China’s influence and presence in the FAS have been largely malign. Look no further than then-FSM President David Panuelo’s letters to the speaker of the House in the waning days of his presidency, warning of Chinese influence in his country. Panuelo highlighted the illegal activities China engaged in to try and build influence and block the United States in the FSM: bribing legislators, using non-representative proxies to sign agreements, and directly threatening Panuelo’s safety.
An expanded responsibility of strategic denial would also have repercussions in the FAS’ Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) that would prove mutually beneficial for the U.S. and the FAS. Chinese illegal, unregulated, and unreported fishing in the FAS’ EEZs poses an economic, security, and environmental challenge. Chinese overfishing threatens the long-term sustainability of marine resources that provide the foundation for the livelihoods of people that the United States has sworn to protect. Proactive maritime law enforcement would also block Chinese research vessels from carrying out nefarious activities in the FAS’ EEZs.
A new conception of strategic denial needs to consider blocking Chinese malign influence in all its forms. Strategic denial should include combatting corruption; blocking criminal activities; closing the visa-free travel loophole; preventing investments in dual-use architecture; countering illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing; sponsoring maritime domain awareness initiatives; promoting good governance; providing law enforcement aid; assuring media freedom; and more.
Of course, strategic denial has never lost its original meaning, but the shift in emphasis to blocking the waters of Micronesia risks U.S. insecurity in the Pacific. Strategic denial originated in a desire to prevent adversaries from using the FAS to pose a military threat to the United States. Today the threat to U.S. interests posed by its adversaries has become much more multi-faceted. To protect a free and open Indo-Pacific, strategic denial also must become more holistic, not less.
