In France as well as Europe, political polarisation grows

In France, “the National Assembly is more fragmented than ever”, wrote Cas Mudde on the night of the second round. “Between seven and ten parties will have to join forces to achieve a majority and exclude the Rassemblement National [RN, far right]”. For the Dutch expert on the far right, “those who say that Macron’s wager has succeeded are wrong. From Macron’s point of view, France is even less governable, because his support in the National Assembly has dwindled considerably, while the RN is far from defeated.” 

After Failing to be appointed France’s new Prime Minister, RN President Jordan Bardella has become the president of Viktor Orbán‘s (Fidesz) newly formed Patriots for Europe (PfE), one of three rival far-right groups in the European Parliament. In his analysis published in the British daily the Guardian, Mudde argues that this new group is merely “another hollow victory for the far right […]. So far, Orbán has been unable to win over his regional allies, such as the Slovak prime minister, Robert Fico, or the Slovene ex-prime minister, Janez Janša.”

Mudde recalls the many reasons why the far right struggles with international collaboration: “clashing personalities, party volatility, ideological extremism and strategic considerations. But these factors are dynamic and have changed as the far right slowly but steadily moves from the margins into the mainstream of European politics. […] In the end, the foundation of Patriots for Europe (and, to a lesser extent, the even newer Europe of Sovereign Nations) [created in the European Parliament on 10 July 2024] will help to further mainstream the far right in the EU.”

What role do electoral systems play in the rise of the far right? Journalists Fabien Escalona and Donatien Huet address the French example in Mediapart. “The risk is convincing ourselves that the two-round voting system has done its job: the RN ends up with 143 MPs, compared with the 190 that a proportional system would have handed the party on 30 June. […] Whatever formula for government is chosen this summer, we must hope that the institutional question, at the heart of the French malaise, is on its agenda.” Escalona and Huet also warn: “If there is a protection this time, its erosion in the future could turn into an electoral jackpot for an RN that has completed its normalisation. What’s more, the fact that the two-round voting system can no longer produce an absolute majority makes it less attractive to those political forces that would have liked to take advantage of it”.

“Polarisation is growing across Europe and the west. Nowhere is this clearer than in the former Soviet republic of Georgia,” writes the Italian political scientist Nathalie Tocci in the Guardian. “Against the backdrop of the protests, the governing party, Georgian Dream, lowered its mask”. Tocci even wonders about democracy’s chances of survival in Georgia: “In a hyperbolic speech in April, the billionaire tycoon and behind-the-scenes leader of the party, Bidzina Ivanishvili, launched an all-out attack against the liberal west, rife with conspiracy theories about a putative “global war party” driven by Freemasons, traitors, foreign agents and more. Georgian Dream does not claim it wants to abandon the path to the EU and NATO. On the contrary, it boasts that under its watch, Georgia was recognised as an EU candidate.”

The EU has now officially suspended Georgia’s accession process and frozen three million euros in financial aid to the Ministry of Defense. At the same time, the decision was made – quite rightly, in Tocci’s view – to push ahead with accession talks with Ukraine and Moldova. “But more is needed”, she insists, because “the opposition also has a strong story to tell: it’s about Europe and freedom versus Russia and repression. An electoral victory in October, it says, represents the only route for Georgia to avoid sinking deeper into a post-Soviet authoritarian swamp. The mass demonstrations against the Russian law, both in 2023 and this year, tell us that it has a compelling case, capable of mobilising people and putting Georgia back on track towards democracy and the EU.” “Tiny Georgia is a microcosm of the fight for liberal democracy in the west”, Tocci concludes. 

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